Suppose each of n men and n women is located at a point in a metric space. A woman ranks the men in order of their distance to her from closest to farthest, breaking ties at random. e men rank the women similarly. An interesting problem is to use these ranking lists and nd a stable matching in the sense of Gale and Shapley. is problem formulation naturally models preferences in several real world applications; for example, dating sites, room renting/le ing, ride hailing and labor markets. Two key questions that arise in this se ing are: (a) When is the stable matching unique without resorting to tie breaks? (b) If X is the distance between a randomly chosen stable pair, what is the distribution of X and what is E(X )? ese questions address conditions under which it is possible to nd a unique (stable) partner, and the quality of the stable matching in terms of the rank or the proximity of the partner.
INTRODUCTION
hailing, where it is desirable to match a hailer with the closest available car. us, a wide variety of real world applications can be modeled in this framework; for example, dating sites, 3 renting/le ing, 4 labor markets, 5 and ride hailing. 6 Our results. We analyze stable matchings in discrete and continuous metric spaces as the number of participants grows large. We make distributional assumptions on the distances between the participants (hence on the preference lists) and analyze the number and quality of stable matchings. e quality of a stable matching is captured by how small the distances are between stable partners in the matching. When the metric space is continuous, the stable matching is almost surely unique under very mild and natural distributional assumptions. However, this is not necessarily true in discrete metric spaces. An interesting nding of our work is that a participant (on either side of the market) is at the same distance from their partner in all stable matchings. us, it makes sense to consider X , the distance between a randomly chosen stable pair (regardless of which stable matching they're picked from, should there be more than one stable matching). We are interested in the distribution of X and E(X ) as the number of participants grows large. We explore these quantities in the dating sites and ride hailing se ings. Dating sites. Suppose the men and women of a community are seeking to get matched to a partner in a dating site. At the time of signing up, participants are usually asked to answer a xed set of k yes/no questions about their preferences, (e.g., "Do you like pets?", "Are you a morning person?"). We call the k-bit vector representing a participant's answers to these questions the participant's pro le. Each pro le can be modeled as a point on the k-dimensional hypercube, Q k . e aim is to match a woman to a man whose pro le is closest or most similar to hers. We consider two di erent metrics on Q k for measuring this similarity: the Hamming distance and the Weighted Hamming distance. e Hamming distance between two pro les is equal to the number of entries at which they disagree. e Weighted Hamming distance weighs some disagreements more; the details are in Section 3. Since the distances are not necessarily distinct, we also assume that each person has a "tie-breaking preference list" for ranking members of the other side and uses this to break ties. One way to think of the actual preference list of a woman is that it ranks the men by distance, closest rst. Men at the same distance are ranked according to her tie-breaking preference list.
e men form their preference lists similarly. 7 We consider the se ing in which pro les are picked independently and uniformly at random from Q k , and the tie-breaking preference lists are chosen independently and uniformly from the set of all permutations. Let ϵ > 0 be an arbitrary positive number. We shall prove that under both the Hamming and the Weighted Hamming distances, for k < (1 − ϵ) log n, the fraction of people with multiple stable partners tends to zero, with high probability, as n → ∞. However, if k = log n , there are exponentially many stable matchings. We show that, with high probability, the stable matching is unique under the Hamming distance for k = Ω(n 6 ), and it is unique under the Weighted Hamming distance for k > (2+ϵ) log n, without resorting to tie breaks. 8 We derive a lower bound on X under the Hamming distance. Under the Weighted Hamming distance, we prove that if k > (1 + ϵ) log n, then log X /log n → −1 in probability.
3 Tinder (h ps://www.gotinder.com), Zoosk (h ps://www.zoosk.com) 4 Airbnb (h ps://www.airbnb.com), Zillow (h p://www.zillow.com) 5 LinkedIn (h ps://www.linkedin.com) 6 Uber (h ps://www.uber.com), Ly (h ps://www.ly .com) 7 One way to generalize this model to matching markets with two di erent questionnaires (one for each side of the market) is to ask each participant to answer their questionnaire and also to indicate their best answers from participants on the other side of the market (e.g., renters and lessors answer their questions and that of an ideal response from the other side). e overall pro le is then formed by concatenating the answers to both questionnaires. 8 Tie-breaking represents chance, which, in the context of dating, could reasonably be thought of as being less preferable to choice. In other words, a participant would prefer to nd his/her partner from their pro le rather than through a process involving a coin ip.
Ride hailing. Consider the problem of matching passengers and cabs on a street. Let blue and red points on the real line represent the location of passengers and cabs, respectively. Suppose the blue and red points occur according to two independent Poisson processes with respective intensities λ and µ. Each point forms its preference list by ranking points of the other color in an increasing order of their Euclidean distance to it. Holroyd et al. [2009] studied translation-invariant matchings between the points of two d-dimensional Poisson processes with the same intensities (λ = µ). ey show the natural algorithm of matching mutually closest pairs of points iteratively yields an almost surely unique stable matching. ey analyze the tail behavior of X , the distance between a typical pair of stable partners. In the 1-dimensional case, they derive power law upper and lower bounds for the tail distribution of X . In this paper, we study the stable matching problem between two Poisson processes on the real line in the unbalanced case where λ < µ. We derive bounds on the distribution of X in terms of the busy cycles of a last-come-rst-served preemptive-resume (LCFS-PR) queue. 9 Using combinatorial arguments, we prove that E(X ) ≤ 1 + ln µ+λ µ−λ /(µ − λ). e rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we de ne the stable matching problem, introduce relevant notation, and state some known results. In Section 3 we describe the stable matching problem on hypercubes and present our results in this model. In Section 4 we analyze the stable matching problem on the real line. Section 5 concludes the paper.
BACKGROUND AND PREVIOUS WORK
A community of n men and n women is represented by sets M and W, respectively. Suppose each person x in the community has a strict preference list, x , which ranks members of the opposite gender. us, 1 x 2 means x prefers 1 to 2 . A matching µ is a mapping from M ∪ W to itself, such that for each man m, µ(m) ∈ W ∪ {m}, for each woman w, µ(w) ∈ M ∪ {w }, and for any m, w ∈ M ∪ W, µ(m) = w implies µ(w) = m. A man or woman x is unmatched under µ if µ(x) = x. A pair (m, w) ∈ M × W is called a blocking pair for a matching µ if w m µ(m) and m w µ(w). A matching is called stable if it does not have any blocking pairs. If a man m and a woman w are matched to each other in a stable matching, we say w and m are a stable partner of each other. e problem of stable matching was rst introduced by Gale and Shapley [1962] . ey proved that there always exists a stable matching, which can be found using an iterative algorithm called the deferredacceptance algorithm. is algorithm proceeds in a series of proposals and tentative approvals until there is a one-to-one matching between the men and women. When the women propose, they each end up with the best stable partner they can have in any stable matching. is matching, o en called woman-optimal, also pairs each man with his lowest-ranked stable partner. e man-optimal stable matching, which results when the men do the proposing, may be distinct from the woman-optimal stable matching; thus, there may be many stable matchings. Under the random preference list assumption, Pi el [1989, 1992] proved that the average number of stable matchings is asymptotic to e −1 n ln n as n → ∞, and each person has Θ(log n) stable partners, on average. e stable marriage problem can be extended to the unbalanced case where the number of men and women is not equal. It is clear that for any stable matching in the unbalanced case, there are some people who remain unmatched. is may also happen in the balanced case if the preference lists of some men or women are not complete. We state the following theorems for ready reference. and Wilson, 1970 , Roth, 1986 ] e set of men and women who are not matched is the same for all stable matchings.
T 2.2. [Immorlica and Mahdian, 2005] Consider the stable marriage problem with n men and n women. Suppose the preference lists of the women are drawn independently and uniformly at random from the 9 Such a queue is also called a stack [Kelly and Yudovina, 2014] .
set of all orderings of men. For a xed k ≥ 1, let the preference lists of the men be drawn independently and uniformly at random from the set of all ordered lists of any k women. ( e k women on two di erent men's preference lists may be di erent.) In this se ing, the expected number of women who have multiple stable partners is o(n).
T 2.3. [Ashlagi et al., 2015] Consider a stable marriage problem with n men and n + k women, for arbitrary k = k(n) ≥ 1. Suppose the preference lists of women are drawn independently and uniformly at random from the set of all orderings of men, and the preference lists of men are drawn independently and uniformly at random from the set of all orderings of women. e fractions of men and women who have multiple stable partners tends to zero, with high probability, as n → ∞.
e independence of the randomly drawn preference lists is the key assumption in the analysis of both eorem 2.2 and eorem 2.3. Under this assumption, eorem 2.2 shows that if the preference lists of one side of the market is limited to a xed k ≥ 1 entries, the fraction of men and women with multiple stable partners is vanishingly small. eorem 2.3 proves the same result for unbalanced markets where there is a size k ≥ 1 discrepancy between the number of men and women. In the following section, we derive similar results for the matching markets with correlated preference lists where each person reveals k ≥ 1 bits of information about their preference by answering k yes/no questions.
STABLE MATCHING ON HYPERCUBES
Consider a dating site with n men and n women, represented by sets M and W. Let S = M ∪ W and let k be a positive integer. For each x ∈ S, let the k-bit vector representing their pro le be denoted by a k (x) = a 1 (x), . . . , a k (x) ∈ {0, 1} k , where a i (x) = 0 if x's answer to the i th question is "no", and a i (x) = 1 otherwise. us, each pro le is a point on the k-dimensional hypercube, Q k = {0, 1} k . For simplicity, we shall suppress the subscript k from a k whenever it can be inferred.
In this se ing, participants prefer to be matched to someone with a similar pro le. Similarity is measured using two metrics on Q k : e Hamming distance and the Weighted Hamming distance. e Hamming distance d h (a, a ) between a and a equals
e Hamming distance assumes that all questions have the same weight. However, some questions may have higher importance than others. For example, "Are you allergic to cats?" will likely outweigh "Do you like caramel?". e Weighted Hamming distance,
addresses this by assigning di erent weights to di erent questions.
Remark. Our results for the Weighted Hamming distance ( eorem 3.4) can be extended to any exponentially decaying weights.
Remark. When making statements which apply to both metrics we shall use the notation d(., .). We shall use d(x, ) to denote the distance between the pro les of participants x and .
e preference list of x is arranged according to distance, as follows: for x, , ∈ S,
Since distances are not necessarily distinct, a tie-breaking rule is needed to strictly order preference lists. As mentioned in the Introduction, participant x uses their "tie-breaking list", T x , to break ties. us, each woman w, ranks men in increasing order of their distance to her and arranges men at the same distance according to their order in her tie-breaking list, T w . 10 For any x and in S, T x is not necessarily equal to T . Let the nal strict preference list of user x be denoted by P x . We shall use x to indicate ordering in this list. We are now ready to state e Pro le Matching Problem (PMP). Given n men and n women and their strict preference lists, the pro le matching problem seeks to nd a stable matching between the men and the women.
A priori, it seems there may be many stable matchings and multiple stable partners for some women and men. However, we shall see in Lemma 3.1 that the multiple stable matchings, should they exist, are all essentially equal in quality. Suppose µ is a stable matching for the PMP. Let d µ (x) be the distance between x and µ(x),
L 3.1. Let µ 1 and µ 2 be two stable matchings for the Pro le Matching Problem. en
P
. See appendix A.1.
According to Lemma 3.1, d µ (x) does not depend on µ. Hence, we shall simply denote d µ (x) by d(x) and call d(x) the matching distance of x. Let the random variable X denote the matching distance of a randomly chosen participant x. We analyze X in the following section.
The Random Profile Matching Problem (RPMP)
We now analyze the PMP under certain distributional assumptions of preference lists and pro les when the number of participants grows large. Our main goals are to understand the following questions: How many questions are needed to nd a unique partner for each participant without resorting to tie-breaking? What is the matching distance, X ? ese questions will be answered under the Hamming and the Weighted Hamming metrics.
Probabilistic assumptions. We assume each participant answers each of the k questions equally likely with a "yes" or a "no". Further, the answers to all questions by all the participants are independent. Geometrically, this assumption places the k-bit pro le vector of each participant (or, equivalently, the participant) at one of the 2 k vertices of Q k , independently and uniformly at random. e preference lists are then generated based on the distances induced by the above placement and the tie-breaking lists T x , x ∈ S. We assume each T x is generated independently and uniformly at random from the set of all orderings of men (or women, depending on x).
e RPMP-k. Given n men and n women, each of whose preference lists are generated according to the above probabilistic assumptions, the RPMP-k aims to nd a stable matching between the men and the women.
Remark. Note that RPMP-0 is equivalent to the standard stable matching problem with randomly generated preference lists.
Our results
In this section we present our main results for the RPMP-k. eorem 3.2 considers the case where k ≤ log n and eorem 3.3 and eorem 3.4 study larger values of k. Due to page limitation we moved all the proofs to appendix. T 3.2. Consider the RPMP-k for k ≥ 1. Fix ϵ > 0. Under any metric on Q k , the following statements hold with high probability:
(i) if k < (1 − ϵ) log n, the fraction of users with multiple stable partners tends to zero as n → ∞, so long as tie-breaking is used; and (ii) if k = log n , there are O(n) users with multiple stable partners and there are exponentially many stable matchings.
T 3.3. Under the Hamming distance, with high probability, we have the following: (i) if k(n) = Ω(n 3 ), the fraction of users with multiple stable partners tends to zero as n → ∞; (ii) if k(n) = Ω(n 6 ), the stable matching is unique without resorting to tie-breaking; and (iii) for any β > 1,
Under the Weighted Hamming distance, with high probability, we have the following:
(i) if k(n) > (1 + ϵ) log n, the fraction of users with multiple stable partners tends to zero as n → ∞. Moreover,
where p − − → represents convergence in probability; and (ii) if k(n) > (2 + ϵ) log n, the stable matching is unique, without resorting to tie-breaking.
According to eorem 3.2, in large instances of the RPMP-k, if users answer even one question (k = 1), the preference lists become skewed so that, with high probability, any given participant has a unique stable partner. is contrasts starkly with the case k = 0, where Pi el [1992] showed that each participant has, on average, Θ(log n) stable partners. In eorem 3.3 and 3.4 we distinguish the statements "the fraction of participants with a unique stable partner goes to 1 with high probability" from the statement "there is a unique stable matching", since the former does not imply the la er. Moreover, our method of proving the la er consists of proving the following two steps: (i) if the distances of each man from a given woman are distinct, then she will have a unique stable partner (see Lemma A.4); and (ii) if this holds for all the women (or all the men), then the stable matching is unique. From a market design perspective the uniqueness of the stable matching is important to achieve a shape prediction of the market. eorem 3.3 shows that under the Hamming distance, if k(n) = Ω(n 6 ), with high probability, there exists a unique stable matching without resorting to tie-breaking. However, asking that many questions from users is not feasible. On the bright side, eorem 3.4 shows that if the answers to questions carry di erent weights, we can achieve a unique stable matching with k(n) = O(log n) questions.
ese theorems also study the matching distance, X . It will be clear from the proof of eorem 3.2 that X = 0, with high probability, when k < (1 − ϵ) log n. eorem 3.3 establishes an upper bound on the matching distance X . eorem 3.4 covers the case of the Weighted Hamming metric. Remark. All above theorems can be extended to unbalanced markets with n men and n + r women.
STABLE MATCHING ON THE LINE
Consider the problem of matching passengers and cabs on a street. Suppose the passengers and cabs are represented as blue and red points, respectively, on R. Let B and R denote the set of blue and red points, respectively. Let S = B ∪ R. A matching between B and R is a mapping M from S to S ∪ {∞}, such that for every red point r , M(r ) ∈ B ∪ {∞}, for every blue point b, M(b) ∈ R ∪ {∞}, and for every b, r ∈ S, M(r ) = b implies M(b) = r . A point x ∈ S is unmatched if M(x) = ∞. e preference list of each point is based on its Euclidean distance to the points with a di erent color, closest rst. A matching M is stable if there is no pair (b, r ) ∈ B × R such that b M(r ) and |r − b|
For any matching M and any point x ∈ S, let I M (x) ⊂ R denote the open interval which has x and M(x) at its end-points, and let
With the above de nitions, suppose that points in B and R occur according to independent Poisson processes with rates µ and λ, respectively, where λ ≤ µ. We call the matching problem de ned above as the Poisson Matching problem and denote it by PM(λ, µ). As mentioned in the Introduction, Holroyd et al.
[2009] studied translation-invariant matchings between two d-dimensional Poisson processes with the same intensities; in particular, they studied stable matchings. ey showed that the following algorithm nds a unique stable matching: Each blue point simultaneously emits two rays, one in each direction, such that at any time t, each ray is at distance t from its emi er. Once a ray hits an unmatched red point r , the emi er b will be matched to r , and both points leave the system. Denote the unique stable matching by M s and let x ∈ B be an arbitrary blue point. De ne the random variable X to be et al., 2009 ] Let B and R be independent 1-dimensional Poisson processes of intensity 1, and let X represent the matching distance of an arbitrary point in the stable matching between B and R. We have,
In this section we analyze the 1-dimensional PM(λ, µ) problem for λ < µ. is models the situation in which there are fewer passengers than cabs and sheds light on the time it would take for a passenger to be picked up by the nearest cab that is assigned to pick up the passenger. 11 us, we shall be interested in the distribution ( eorem 4.5) and the expected value ( eorem 4.7) of X . However, in order to get at these quantities, we need to introduce various ideas such as the relationship among PM(λ, µ), last-come-rstserved preemptive-resume (LCFS-PR) queue, and nested matchings. We believe these ideas are interesting in their own right.
eue Matching
Red partners in a stable matching may be either to the le or to the right of the corresponding blue points. However, in queue matchings they are either only on the le or only on the right. Consider PM(λ, µ) with the constraint that each blue point can only be matched to red points that are on its right. In the passenger-cab scenario, this constraint can be the result of having a one-way street or a road divider, where each cab can only pick up passengers on its le . In order to nd the stable matching, all the blue points simultaneously emit a ray to their right at time 0. Once a ray hits an unmatched red point r , the emi er b will be matched to r . It is clear that this algorithm is equivalent to running an LCFS-PR queue where the time of job arrivals and departures in this queue are represented as blue points and red points, respectively. e arrival rate is λ and the service rate is µ (the service times are i.i.d. exponentials of rate µ). We call the resulting stable matching, M + s , the forward queue matching, corresponding to running the queue forward in time. Similarly, we can de ne a backward queue matching, M − q , where each blue point is matched to a red point on its le , and can be found by running the LCFS-PR queue backward in time. Figure 1 shows M + s , M − s , and M s for an instance of the problem. e following are well-known facts about LCFS-PR queues with rate λ Poisson arrivals and rate µ > λ i.i.d. exponential service times which are independent of the arrival process. Since λ < µ, the queue is stable and each blue point in B almost surely has a partner in R. Let x ∈ B be an arbitrary blue point and let X + be x's matching distance in M + s . It is clear that X + has the same distribution as the busy cycle in the corresponding LCFS-PR queue, where the busy cycle is the duration of time from the arrival of a job at an empty queue to the time the job leaves the queue. It is known [Gross and Harris, 1998 ] that the probability density function of the busy cycle is given by
where ρ = λ µ , and I 1 is the modi ed Bessel function of the rst kind. Let B(λ, µ) represent this distribution. e average busy cycle duration is E(X + ) = 1/(µ − λ). In the following section we introduce a class of matchings which includes both stable and queue matchings.
Nested Matching
For any interval I ∈ R, represent its closure byĪ . A matching M is said to be nested if for any x, ∈ S, x ∈ I M ( ) implies M(x) ∈ I M ( ). erefore, in any nested matching if I M (x) ∩ I M ( ) ∅, then one of the matching segments is nested inside the other one. Remark. Since the matching segment of an unmatched point x is (x, ∞), there is no matching segment of a matched point in a nested matching which contains an unmatched point. From the discussion in the previous section it is easy to see that any queue matching is nested. e following lemma proves that the stable matching M s is also nested. Let A be the set of all nested matchings between points in B and R. We say a red point r is a potential match for a blue point b, if there exists a nested matching in which b is matched to r . For any blue point b ∈ B de ne P(b) to be the set of all potential matches of b,
e following lemma shows that the set of potential matches of any two blue points are either disjoint or the same.
Now de ne the relation ∼ on points in B as follow:
According to Lemma 4.3, for any b 1 , b 2 ∈ B, if P(b 1 ) and P(b 2 ) are not disjoint, then they are the same. erefore, ∼ is an equivalence relation on B. For any blue point b ∈ B, de ne [b] to be b's equivalence class in B, i.e.,
In the following lemma we prove some facts about the structure of the equivalence classes. 
i is even}, and P(b) = {w i : i is odd}. In other words, this sequence starts with a potential red point, alternates between points in [b] and P(b), and ends with another potential red point. We call the sequence {w i } b's potential wave and denote it by W(b). Figure 2 shows potential waves of an instance of PM(λ, µ). 12 A key observation here is that in any nested matching, any blue point in [b] should be matched to a red point in P(b). erefore, a nested matching rst partitions S into potential waves and then matches points within each wave, separately. In the following section we present our results on the analysis of the matching distance X in the stable matching M s . 
Matching distance, X
e following theorem, proves bounds on the distribution of X , in terms of busy cycles.
T 4.5. Consider an instance of a Poisson matching problem PM(λ, µ), where λ < µ. en we have
where B Using eorem 4.5 we can nd the following upper bound for the expected matching distance E(X ).
Remark. Note that the results of eorem 4.5 and Corollary 4.6 also hold if X is the matching distance in any nested matching.
In the next theorem we improve the upper bound given in Corollary 4.6 for the expected matching distance E(X ). e proof of this theorem is extensive and requires some detailed combinatorial arguments. For more details see appendix A.3.
T 4.7. For the stable matching M s , we have
In order to evaluate the goodness of the bound in eorem 4.7, note that for large values of µ (µ λ), with a high probability, each blue point will be matched to the closest red point to it. erefore, as µ/λ → ∞, X converges to an exponential distribution with rate 2µ (minimum of two i.i.d. exponentials with rate µ) and E(X ) ∼ 1 2µ . However, from eorem 4.7, in the limit as µ/λ → ∞, E(X ) is upper bounded by 1 µ .
CONCLUSION
is paper introduced a model for studying matching markets in which preference lists are drawn according to distances in appropriate metric spaces, either between the pro les of participants or between the participants themselves. e model naturally captures several aspects of real world matching markets. Various results regarding the uniqueness and quality of stable matchings were obtained. Speci cally, for matchings on the hypercube under the Hamming and Weighted Hamming distances, lower and upper bounds were obtained on the dimension of the hypercube (equal to the number of questions a participant in a dating site needs to answer) so as to obtain unique stable partners or stable matchings. Furthermore, bounds on the distribution and the average value of the matching distance of a typical participant (a measure of the quality of the stable matching) were obtained for stable matchings on the hypercube and on the real line.
We view this work as a rst step in studying matching markets in the metric space se ing. Several obvious next steps suggest themselves, notably studying the problem under dynamic inputs; i.e., as participants arrive and depart.
A APPENDIX A.1 Proofs omi ed from section 3
Proof of Lemma 3.1: Assume, by contradiction, that there exist stable matchings µ 1 and µ 2 so that for some z ∈ S,
Let r = (r 1 + r 2 )/2. For each x ∈ S, let P x = { ∈ P x : d(x, ) ≤ r } be the preference list P x truncated to contain only those participants who are at a distance less or equal to r from x. Let the ordering in the truncated list P x be denoted by x . Call the PMP restricted to the truncated preference lists as the "truncated matching problem". In the truncated matching problem, each person prefers to remain unmatched than to match with a person at a distance greater than r from them. Let µ be a stable matching for the PMP which has stable partners with a matching distance greater than r . Construct the partial matching µ from µ by removing all pairs with a distance greater than r . We show that µ is a stable matching for the truncated matching problem. Suppose m and w are not matched to each other in µ . If d(m, w) > r , then clearly (m, w) cannot form a blocking pair for the truncated matching problem. Suppose d(m, w) ≤ r . Since m and w are not matched to each other in µ , they cannot be matched to each other in µ. Moreover, since µ is stable, either µ(m) m w, or µ(w) w m. Without loss of generality, assume µ(m) m w. erefore,
is implies m is also matched to µ(m) in µ ; i.e., µ (m) = µ(m). erefore, µ (m) m w and (m, w) cannot be a blocking pair for µ . is proves that µ is a stable matching for the truncated matching problem. Now de ne S r (µ) to be the set of all users who are matched to someone at a distance greater than r in µ,
It is clear that S r (µ) is the same set of users who are not matched in µ . By the Rural Hospital eorem, the set of unmatched men and women in the truncated matching problem is the same in all stable matchings.
is implies S r (µ) does not depend on µ. is contradicts our initial assumption, since z ∈ S r (µ 2 ) but z S r (µ 1 ), proving the lemma.
Consider the RPMP-k. Let M and W represent the set of n men and n women, respectively. For any pro le a = (a 1 , ..., a k ) ∈ Q k , let M a and W a be the sets of all men and women whose pro les equal a, respectively. De ne
A.1. Fix a ∈ Q k and without loss of generality assume |M a | ≤ |W a |. We claim that in every stable matching, each man in M a will be matched to a woman in W a .
P
. Suppose to the contrary that there is a stable matching µ and an m ∈ M a such that µ(m) W a . Since |M a | ≤ |W a |, there should also exist a woman w ∈ W a such that µ(w) M a . However, since d(m, w) = 0, w m µ(m) and m w µ(w).
erefore, (m, w) forms a blocking pair for µ, which is a contradiction.
us, for any a ∈ Q k , every stable matching should rst try to match men in M a with women in W a according to their tie-breaking preference lists. Any one unmatched woman in |W a | will be matched to someone at a further distance. De ne U a to be the set of all users with pro le a, which are matched to someone with a pro le di erent from a. Note that according to the Rural Hospital eorem, U a is the same for all stable matchings and
where p = 2 −k , Z 1 and Z 2 are independent standard normal-N (0, 1)-random variables, and
where N 1 and N 2 are two independent random variables with a standard normal distribution, i.e., N 1 , N 2 ∼ N (0, 1). erefore, as n → ∞,
It is clear that Z 1 , Z 2 ∼ N (0, 1). Moreover, since N 1 and N 2 are independent, Z 1 and Z 2 are also independent. is completes the proof.
Since Lemma A.1 requires each stable matching µ to rst match men and women in S a using their tie-breaking preference lists, the O( √ n) discrepancy between the number of men and women in S a makes this sub-problem signi cantly unbalanced. Using the approach of Ashlagi et al. [2015] , we prove some useful bounds on the number of stable partners in unbalanced matching problems which is true for every n.
L
A.3. Let r ≥ 1 and consider an unbalanced two-sided matching problem with n men and n + r women represented by M and W, respectively. Suppose the men's preference lists are generated independently and uniformly at random from the set of all orderings of women in W. Similarly, suppose the women's preference lists are generated independently and uniformly at random from the set of all orderings of men in M. For any given x ∈ M ∪ W, let N (x) represent the number of x's stable partners. We have that
P . Let µ M represent the men-optimal stable matching found by running the men-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm, and let U be the set of all women who are not matched in µ M . According to the Rural Hospital eorem, the set of women who are unmatched is the same as U for all stable matchings. Let w ∈ W\U be an arbitrary woman. In order to nd all the stable partners of w, we employ the same algorithm that is used in McVitie and Wilson [1970] , Immorlica and Mahdian [2005] , and Ashlagi et al. [2015] . It has been proved by Immorlica and Mahdian [2005] that the following algorithm outputs all the stable partners of w.
Algorithm I
(1) Run the men-proposing algorithm to nd the men-optimal stable matching µ M . If w is unmatched in µ M , output ∅. In order to analyze algorithm I, we use the principle of deferred decision which assumes that the random preference lists are not known in advance and rather unfold step by step in the algorithms when a proposal/rejection happens. Let t i be the time of the i th visit of the algorithm at step 3, and de ne u i and w i to be the unmatched man and the next woman who u i wants to propose to at time t i . Also de ne X i to be the set of all women who u i has not proposed to yet at time t i . Since we are using the principle of deferred decision, at any time t i , rankings of women in X i are not yet unfolded in u i 's preference list. erefore, at any time t i , every woman in X i has the same chance of 1/|X i | to receive the next proposal from u i . De ne the events E i = w i ∈ {w } ∪ U . Since the algorithm has not been terminated by time t i , U ⊆ X i . erefore, given E i , the probability that u i proposes to w is at most 1/(r + 1), and the probability that the algorithm terminates is at least r /(r + 1), i.e. ,
P(w
, and P( e algorithm terminates at t i | E i ) ≥ r r + 1 .
As the algorithm progresses, woman w nds a new stable partner only if she receives a proposal from an unmatched man at step 3 of the algorithm. Let V i be the total number of proposals received by woman w from time t 1 to time t i . If E i does not occur then V i+1 = V i , and if E i occurs then V i+1 = V i + 1 with a probability of at most 1/(r + 1) and the algorithm terminates with a probability at least r /(r + 1). erefore, if V represents the total number of proposals received by w a er time t 1 , V is stochastically dominated by a geometric random variable with rate p = r /(r + 1). us,
, and
Since N (w) ≤ 1 + V , the proof is complete for any w ∈ W. It remains to prove the inequalities for x ∈ M. Fix x ∈ M. Note that the two events {N (x) > 1} and {N (µ M (x)) > 1} are equivalent. erefore, Since µ M (x) ∈ W,
Moreover, since m ∈M N (m) = w ∈W\U N (w) (both are equal to the total number of stable partner pairs), from symmetry we have,
We now prove eorem 3.2 by using Lemmas A.2 and A.3. Proof of eorem 3.2: Part (i). We prove this part of the theorem only for constant pro le size k ≥ 1. e proof for arbitrary pro le size k ≤ (1 − ϵ) log n is similar. Fix n and consider an instance of the random pro le matching problem with n men and n women represented by M (n) and W (n) , respectively. Let x ∈ M (n) ∪ W (n) be an arbitrary user and let a ∈ Q k represent his/her pro le. De ne M 
According to Lemma A.2, as n → ∞, Z 
Let δ > 0 be an arbitrary positive number. Choose ϵ > 0 small enough to have,
2 converge in distribution to Z 1 and Z 2 , respectively, there exists a large number N 1 such that for any n > N 1 ,
erefore, for any n > N 1 we have,
erefore, with a probability of at least 1 − δ /2, the following event occurs:
where
e problem of matching men in M (n) a and women in W (n) a according to preference lists given by P is an unbalanced matching problem with a discrepancy equal to r between the number of men and the number of women. Let U (n) a represent the set of unmatched women in the men-optimal stable matching for this unbalanced matching problem. erefore, if N (n) (x) represents the number of x's stable partners, we have,
where in the rst inequality we used the results of the Lemma A.3, and in the last inequality we used the bounds on r and |S (n) a | given by the event E. Pick N 2 large enough to have,
is implies that with high probability the fraction of users with multiple stable partners tends to zero as n → ∞. Part (ii). In order to prove the second part of the theorem, note that since |M a | and |W a | are Binomial random variables with parameters n and p = 2 −k = 1/n, according to the well-known Poisson limit theorem, both converge to the Poisson(1) distribution as n goes to in nity. erefore, in the limit, with a positive probability of c = e −2 /4 there are exactly two men and two women whose pro les are equal to a. On the other hand, it is easy to see that in a random stable matching problem with two men and two women, the probability of having exactly two stable matchings is equal to 1/8. erefore, for any given pro le a ∈ Q k , with a positive probability of β = c/8 > 0, there are exactly two men and two women with pro le a who have multiple stable partners. is proves that the expected number of users with multiple stable partners is O(n). Moreover, since the number of such pro les is O(n), in expectation there are exponentially many stable matchings. e following lemma shows that if the preference list of a user is uniquely identi ed by pro le distances and no further tie-breaking is required, then he/she has a unique stable partner.
L
A.4. In a pro le matching problem, if the distances of a given user x from all the members of the opposite sex are distinct, then x has a unique stable partner.
P
. By contradiction, suppose x has two di erent stable partners 1 and 2 . According to Lemma 3.1, 1 and 2 should be at the same distance from x. But, this contradicts with the assumption that x has di erent distances from 1 and 2 . erefore, x has a unique stable partner.
In order to apply Lemma A.4, k should be large enough to have a unique stable matching without resorting to tie-breaks. Now we prove eorems 3.3 and 3.4.
Proof of eorem 3.3: Part (i). Let x be an arbitrary user and without loss of generality, assume x ∈ W. Suppose x has multiple stable partners and let and be two di erent stable partners of x. Since x has multiple sable partners, also has another stable partner x (di erent from x). According to Lemma 3.1,
. For any z ∈ M de ne the following event
Using the union bound we have,
where m and w are a man and a woman who are chosen randomly from M and W, respectively. Note that in the last inequality we used the existing symmetry in the problem. Since d h (x, m) has a binomial distribution (as a function of the random variable m), the maximum value of
Using the Sterling approximation we have:
erefore,
Since k = Ω(n 3 ), the right hand side of the above inequality tends to zero as n goes to in nity. is implies that with high probability the fraction of users with multiple stable partners tends to zero as n goes to in nity. Note that using the union bound, we can conclude that if k = Ω(n 4 ), with high probability, there exists a unique stable matching. Part (ii). Fix a woman x ∈ W. For any ∈ M, de ne the event E = {∃ ∈ M\{ }; d h (x, ) = d h (x, )}. Also de ne A x to represent the event that the distances of x from all men in M are distinct. Similar to part (i) we have
According to Lemma A.4, if the event A x happens for every x ∈ W, there is a unique stable matching without resorting to tie-breaking. erefore,
Since k = Ω(n 6 ), the probability that there are multiple stable matchings goes to zero as n goes to in nity.
Part (iii). Without loss of generality assume x ∈ W and let X i represent the distance of x from man m i , i.e.,
Clearly, X i 's are i.i.d. with Binomial distribution with parameters k and 1/2. De ne Z = min i X i . Clearly d h (x) ≥ Z . erefore, for any positive number r > 0,
Now, according to the Cherno 's inequality,
Now if we set r = k/2 − βk log n we have,
Proof of eorem 3.4: Part (i). Without loss of generality assume x ∈ M and suppose is a stable partner for x. If x has multiple stable partners, then should also have multiple stable partners. Let x be another stable partner of di erent from x. According to Lemma 3.1, x and x should have the same distance from . However, in the weighted hamming distance metric, if
, then x and x should have the exact same pro les, i.e., a(x) = a(x ). erefore, if a man x has multiple stable partners, there should exist another man x with the same pro le as him. However, by using union bounds we get
is proves that the probability that x has multiple stable partners is vanishingly small.
Part (ii).
We rst show that if there are multiple stable matchings, then there are two men (or women) who have the same pro le. If there are multiple stable matchings, there should exists a chain {c i } 2s−1 i=0 of men and women such that c i ∈ M if i is even, and c i ∈ W if i is odd. Moreover, in this chain for every i ∈ {0, . . . , 2s − 1}, c i+1 c i c i−1 (i − 1 and i + 1 are taken in mode 2s). De ne
Let j be the index at which d i is minimum. Now, if the values of d i are all distinct, then c j c j+1 c j+2 which is a contradiction. erefore, ere should exist an index i such that, d i = d i+1 . Following our discussion in part (i), this implies that c i and c i+2 should have the same pro le. However, the probability that two randomly selected men (or women) have the same pro le is 2 −k . Using union bound we can conclude that the probability that there are multiple stable matchings is upper bounded by n 2 2 −k ≤ n −ϵ . part (iii) In order to analyze X , x n and let ϵ > 0 be an arbitrary positive real number. Let µ be an arbitrary stable matching. With out loss of generality assume x ∈ W and de ne a = a(x). For any positive integer r , de ne S a (r ) as the set of all the users who have the same answers as x for the rst r questions,
First note that for any given users x, ∈ S a (r ) and S a (r ),
erefore, if we de ne W a (r ) = S a (r ) ∩ W and M a (r ) = S a (r ) ∩ M, then the number of users in S a (r ) who are not matched to someone in S a (r ) in µ is |W a (r )| − |M a (r )| . Set r = (1 − ϵ) log n and de ne p r = 2 −r ≥ n ϵ −1 . Since |W a | and |M a | have Binomial distributions with parameters n and p r , following the discussions in Lemma A.2, |S a (r )| = O(p r n) and |W a (r )| − |M a (r )| = O( √ p r n). erefore,
is proves that,
On the other hand, if we set r = (1 + ϵ) log n , then,
where in the last inequality we used the union bound inequality. erefore,
From (1) and (2) we can conclude that log d w (x)/log n converges to −1 in probability.
A.2 Proofs omi ed from section 4
Proof of Lemma 4.2: Let x, ∈ S and suppose x ∈ I ( ). Assume, by contradiction, M s (x) I ( ). erefore, either ∈ I (x) or M s ( ) ∈ I (x). Without loss of generality, assume ∈ I (x). If x and have di erent colors, since
will form a blocking pair for M s which is a contradiction. Now suppose x and have the same color and without loss of generality, assume
is a blocking pair for M which is a contradiction. erefore, M s (x) ∈ I ( ) and the proof is complete.
For any x, ∈ R where x < , de ne (x, ) to be the di erence between the number of red and blue points in the open interval (x, ), (x, ) |{r ∈ R : r ∈ (x, )}| − |{b ∈ B : b ∈ (x, )}| .
For simplicity of notation, for x > let (x, ) = ( , x). Let M be a nested matching and let b ∈ B be an arbitrary blue point which is matched under M. Since M is nested, any red or blue point on x's matching segment I M (x), should be matched to a point on I M (x). erefore, there should be an equal number of red and blue points on
Moreover, for any b 1 , b 2 ∈ B, P(b 1 ) ∩ P(b 2 ) ∅ implies P(b 1 ) = P(b 2 ) and (b 1 , b 2 ) = 1. P . Let Q(b) represent the right hand side of the equation in the lemma. We want to prove that P(b) = Q(b). For any r ∈ P(b), there exists a nested matching M such that M(b) = r . erefore, (b, r ) = 0 and this implies that P(b) ⊆ Q(b). Now let r ∈ Q(b). Let S 1 ⊆ S represent the set of all the point in S between b and r , and let S = S\ S 1 ∪ {b, r } . Since r ∈ Q(b), S 1 has an equal number of red and blue points. Let M 1 represent the stable matching for points in S 1 , and let M 1 represent the stable matching for points in S 1 . According to Lemma 4.2, both M 1 and M 1 are nested. Let M be the matching in which b is matched to r , and points in S 1 and S 1 are matched according to matchings M 1 and M 1 , respectively. It is clear that since M 1 and M 1 are nested, M is also nested. erefore, r is b's potential match and r ∈ P(b).
is proves that Q(b) ⊆ P(b), and the proof for the rst part of the lemma is complete. Now let b 1 , b 2 ∈ B be two arbitrary blue points. Without loss of generality assume b 1 < b 2 . Let r ∈ R be an arbitrary red point.
ere are three di erent possibilities for r 's placement with respect to b 1 and b 2 :
there exists a red point r * such that r * ∈ P(b 1 ) and r * ∈ P(b 2 ).
erefore, (b 1 , r * ) = (b 2 , r * ) = 0. According to the equations described above, we should have (b 1 , b 2 ) = 1 (in all there cases). Now since (b 1 , b 2 ) = 1, with a same argument, we can conclude that for any r ∈ R, (b 1 , r ) = 0 if and only if (b 2 , r ) = 0. erefore, P(b 1 ) = P(b 2 ).
Proof of Lemma 4.4: Let {x t } t ∈Z represent the sequence of all the points in S = B ∪ R, where x 0 = b, and for any t ∈ Z + , let x t and x −t represent the t th point to the right and the t th to the le of b, respectively. Since, S is the mixture of two Poisson processes with rates λ and µ, {x t } occurs according to a Poisson process with rate λ + µ. Moreover for any t ∈ Z, x t is red with probability p = µ/(λ + µ) and is blue with probability q = 1 − p = λ/(λ + µ), independent from the color of the other points. Note that since λ < µ, p > 1/2. De ne the sequence { t } t ∈Z + , where t = (x −1 , x t ). It is easy to see that, erefore, the sequence { t } is equivalent to a random walk on Z that starts at 1 = −1 and moves to the right or le according to probabilities P(+1) = p and P(−1) = q. Suppose this random walk hits 0 at some some time t ∈ Z + , i.e. , t = 0. If x t −1 is a red point then since (b, x t −1 ) = (x −1 , x t ) = t = 0, then x t −1 ∈ P(b). If x t is a blue point then since (b, x t ) = (x −1 , x t ) + 1 = t + 1 = 1, then x t ∈ [b] . A geometric interpretation of these facts is the following: If the random walk at time t hits zero from below, then x t −1 ∈ P(b), and if it hits zero from above and then goes below zero, then x t ∈ [b]. Part (i). Since p > 1/2, lim t →+∞ t = +∞, almost surely. erefore, since the random walk starts at −1, it hits 0 at some time t > 0, almost surely. Let t 1 be the rst time that the random walk hits 0, i.e. , t 1 = min{t : t = 0}. De ne r 1 = x t 1 −1 . According to what we discussed above, r 1 ∈ P(b). Similarly, we can prove the existence of r 2 . Part (ii), Let b 1 = min{x ∈ [b] : x > b}. erefore, b and b 1 are consecutive points in [b] . It is clear that it is su cient to prove the statement for these two points. According to lemma 4.4, (b,
Since t 1 (de ned in part (i)) is the rst time that the random walk hits 0, then r 1 < x t 1 ≤ b 1 . erefore, r 1 is a potential match between b and b 1 . If there exists another potential match r 2 = x t 2 ∈ P(b) between b and b 1 , then since t 2 +1 = 0, r 2 > r 1 . But t 1 = t 2 +1 = 0 and t 2 = −1. erefore, there exists t 1 ≤ t < t 2 such that t = 0 and t +1 = −1. erefore, b = x t ∈ [b] which is a contradiction with the fact hat b and b 1 are consecutive in [b] . Part (iii). e third part of the lemma is an immediate result of part (ii). Part (iv) Following the discussion we had at the beginning, the random walk nds a new blue point in [b] if and only if it hits zero and then goes to −1. However, starting from zero, the probability that the random walk visits −1 again is q/p = λ/µ [Kelly and Yudovina, 2014] .
is proves that N + (b) has a geometric distribution with rate 1 − λ/µ. By symmetry, the same holds for N − (b). 
P
. Due to the existing symmetry, without loss of generality, assume b = w i is a blue point and r = w i+1 is a red point. Now if we consider the forward queue matching described in section 2, it is easy to see that u i = r − b is equivalent to the busy cycle of the corresponding LCFS-PR queue. (λ, µ) . Now since b should be matched with one of its potential partners in P(b), its matching distance cannot be less than min{B 1 , B 1 } or more than max
Proof of Corollary 4.6: Let b be an arbitrary blue point and let
Let c i represent the number of matching segments in M s which contain the interval (w i , w i+1 ). It is clear that c i cannot be larger than the total number of points in W(b) to the le of w i+1 or the total number of points in W(b) to the right of w i . In other words, if we de ne
A.3 Proof of Theorem 4.7
In this section we prove eorem 4.7. Suppose n = 2m > 0 be an even positive integer and let x = (x 1 , ..., x n ) be a sequence of n positive numbers. Let C(x) represent the con guration of n + 1 red and blue points P 1 , ..., P n+1 which are placed in order on the real line such that the point P 1 is at the origin, and for any 1 ≤ i ≤ n, P i+1 = P i + x i . Moreover, suppose P i is blue if i is even and it is red if i is odd. erefore, there are m + 1 red points and m blue points in C(x). Since there is no assumption on the value of x i 's, the stable matching between points in B and R is not necessarily unique. (as an example consider the case where x i = 1). Let M be a stable matching for this problem which is generated by the following algorithm. e algorithm repeatedly matches an unmatched blue point b and an unmatched red point r which have the minimum distance from each other, among all the remaining unmatched points, till no further matching is possible. Let D M (x) represent the sum of all matching distances in M,
De ne D(x) to be the expected value of D M (x), where the expectation is taken with respect to the random stable matchings M which is generated according to the algorithm. Let n represent the set of all 
De ne E(x) to be the expected value of D π (x), where the expectation is taken with respect to the random permutation π : 
De ne the function P : O k → R + as follows:
where c(o, i) represents the number of appearance of the number i in o.
For example, for k = 6 we have O 6 = {{1, 5}, {3, 3}, {3, 1, 1, 1}, {1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1}}. Furthermore, P ({1, 5}) = 2 5 , P ({3, 3}) = 1 9 , P ({3, 1, 1, 1}) = 4 9 , and P ({1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1}) = 2 45 . In the following lemma, we prove that for any k the function P is a probability measure on O k .
L
A.9. e function P is a probability measure on O k . In other words:
P . From Taylor series expansion of log(x), for |x | < 1 we have,
2i + 1 . Now using the Taylor expansion of e x , we have:
From de nition A.8, it is easy to see that if we expand the right hand side of the above equation as
is proves that for any k ≥ 1,
De nition A.10. For any o = {o 1 , . . . , o r } ∈ O k and any x = {x 1 , . . . , x n }, de ne Φ(o, x) to be the set of all possible ways of spli ing {x 1 , . . . x n } into sets with sizes o 1 , . . . , o r .
For example for o = {1, 1} ∈ O 2 and x = {x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , x 4 },
It's easy to see that
where c(o, i) is the number of appreance of the number i in o.
De nition A.11. For any o = {o 1 , . . . , o r } ∈ O k and any x = {x 1 , . . . , x n }, de ne f (o, x) as follows:
, where in the summation it is assumed that ϕ is in the following form,
In the following theorem, we nd a close expression for
. Let n = 2m. Suppose x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) and without loss of generality assume that x 1 ≤ x 2 ≤ · · · ≤ x n . Let π be a random permutation which is drawn uniformly from n . In order to nd a stable matching for π (x), the algorithm should rst nd an index i 1 ∈ {1, . . . , n} where P i+1 − P i = x 1 , and then matches points P i and P i+1 to each other. Since, π is drawn uniformly at random, i 1 is uniformly distributed over {1, . . . , n}, i.e. , P(i1 = i) = 1/n, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Due to the existing symmetry we can assume that i 1 ∈ {1, . . . , m}. Now, conditioning on i 1 we have,
For i = 1, by conditioning on the second segment at index 2, we have
where x {i } represents the sequence of n − 2 positive numbers which is generated from x by removing x 1 and x i . For i > 1, by conditioning on the segments at indices i − 1 and i + 1, we have
where x {i, j } represent the sequence of n − 2 positive integers which is generated from x by removing x 1 , x i , and x j and adding x 1 + x i + x j . We prove the theorem by induction on n. For n = 2, it is clear that E (x 1 , x 2 ) = min(x 1 , x 2 ). Assume the theorems statement is valid for n-2. From equations (4), (5), and (6) and from the induction assumption it is clear that E(x) can be wri en as a linear combination of terms with the following form,
x, . . . ,
where S i 's are disjoint subsets of {x 1 , . . . , x n } with an odd size. Suppose S i = {x (7) in E(x). According to equation 3, It is su cient to prove that,
We Prove this by considering two di erent cases: (i) x 1 S, and (ii) x 1 ∈ S i for some i. (i) e term A, has the following constant factor C 1 in the equation 5,
e reason is that in order for term to appear in in E(x {i } ), it is su cient to have i S which occurs with probability n−k−1 n−1 . e term A also appear in E(x {i, j } ) if i S and j S which occurs with probability (n−k −1)(n−k −2) (n−1)(n−2) . erefore, the term A has the following constant factor C 2 in the equation 6, C 2 = (n − k − 1)(n − k − 2) (n − 1)(n − 2)
Since, C = 2 n C 1 + n−2 n C 2 , it is easy to derive equation (8) from equations (9) and (10). (ii) Without loss of generality assume x 1 ∈ S 1 . First we consider the case where o 1 > 1, i.e. , |S 1 | ≥ 3.
It is clear that in this case the term A does not appear in equation (5), i.e. , C 1 = 0. A appears in E(x {i, j } ) if and only if i, j ∈ S 1 which occurs with probability (o 1 −1)(o 1 −2) (n−1)(n−2) . erefore, it has the following constant factor C 2 in the equation (6),
Since C = n−2 n C 2 , we can derive the equation (8) from (11). For o 1 = 1, the value of A is equal to x 1 . On the other hand if we consider all the terms A with S 1 = {x 1 }, it is easy to see that the sum of all of their coe cient is equal to 1 which is consistent with the coe cient of x 1 in equation 4 (if we plug in equations (5)) and (6). C A.13. E(x) is a concave function of x.
P . According to de nition A.11 it is clear that f (o, x) is a concave function of x (for any o). erefore, from eorem A.12 we can conclude that E(x) is a concave function of x. Now de ne x n = (1, . . . , 1), to be the sequence of n numbers all equal to 1. e following lemma proves an upper bound for E(x) for arbitrary x in terms of E(x n ).
A.14. For any x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ), we have
P . For any i ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1}, de ne x (i) = (x i+1 , . . . , x n , x 1 , x i ). First not that E(x (i) ) = E(x), ∀i ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1}.Since E(x) is a concave function of x, we have
In the following lemma we prove an upper bound for E(x n ). L A.15. Let n = 2m. We have, E(x n ) ≤ m(1 + ln m).
P . Similar to the proof of eorem A.12 conditioning on the value of the rst index i 1 , we have
where x n−2 = (3, 1, . . . , 1) and has n −2 entries. According to Lemma A.14, E(x n−2 ) ≤ n n−2 E(x n−2 ). erefore, E(x n ) ≤ 1 + ( 1 m + 1)E(x n−2 ) ≤ 1 + ( m m − 1 )E(x n−2 ).
By induction on m, we have
is completes the proof. where in the last inequality we used the results of Lemma A.14 and A.15. Since x is arbitrary, we can conclude E(X |m) = E E(X |x, m) ≤ (1 + ln m)
On the other hand, since ln(x) is a concave function, from Jensen inequality we have E(X ) = E E(X |m) ≤ E (1 + ln m)
